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Abstract 
 
The aim of this research was to explore the rather undocumented world of the wider 
policing community acting in an official capacity on behalf of the Irish state in 2013 and 
to produce a comprehensive empirical mapping of these governance entities.  This 
group was defined as those operating in a coercive manner at the most extreme end of 
the social control spectrum and the research therefore focused on those organisations 
actively prosecuting cases in the Irish courts.  
 
A mixed method design was used to maximise both quantitative and qualitative 
information.  As this mapping exercise was the first of its kind, a complete collection 
sample was conducted and a comprehensive questionnaire was issued to all identified 
organisations. Simultaneously, the author completed a documentary analysis of relevant 
reports produced by Dáil and Seanad Éireann during the first seven months of 2013. 
 
The research succeeded in empirically mapping a total of fifty-one policing 
organisations, which were active in the Irish criminal justice system.  The study also 
discovered a substantial increase in the proliferation of these policing agencies over the 
last two decades.  In addition, there appeared to be a greater preponderance to select the 
prosecution option as an enforcement method, with long established organisations now 
prosecuting for the first time. 
 
The research has relevance to the Irish state, as it has for the first time documented all 
prosecuting (policing) organisations operating within the Irish criminal justice system, 
alongside An Garda Síochána and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP).  The study 
allows policy makers to compare and contrast organisations performing a similar 
policing role with a view to maximising efficiency of resources and also to ensure that 
those charged with policing Irish society do so in a fair and transparent manner.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Rationale for the Research 
 
One consequence of the post welfare state period was the transfer of traditional policing 
duties from state police to various factions across society.  This occurrence, labelled as 
‘pluralisation’ is widely recognised in criminological literature.  However, it would 
appear from a review of existing literature that research in the field of plural policing 
has concentrated on the transfer of policing roles to the general public and to the ever 
expanding commercial sector of private security (Crawford, Lister, Blackburn, and 
Burnett, 2005).  Much less explored are the many state agencies that now perform a 
policing role and it is this gap in the literature, which is the rationale for this study. 
 
This gap is somewhat surprising given the ‘indispensable’ importance attributed to the 
state, and the forms of public policing governed by it, by such acclaimed scholars as 
Loader and Walker (2007:7).  Such a study is of even greater relevance to the Irish state, 
which has undergone a major expansion of state agencies since the early 1990s with 
what MacCarthaigh (2010:11) described as being a ‘wave of agency establishment’.   
 
1.2 Aim and Objectives of the Research 
 
The role of An Garda Síochána, which acts as the lead law enforcement agency within 
the Irish state is complemented by an increasing number of government organisations, 
which pro-actively police their own particular field of responsibility.  In fact, the official 
website for the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) includes a ‘Criminal Process 
Chart’, with the wording ‘An Garda Síochána & Specialised Investigating Agencies 
conduct independent criminal investigations’.  The aim of this research was to explore 
the various policing organisations in existence in 2013 in Ireland and produce a 
comprehensive empirical mapping of these governance entities.  A clear set of 
objectives, which was developed to fulfil this aim, is listed below. 
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1. To identify the different policing organisations in Ireland. 
2. To critically evaluate and explain any emerging patterns in terms of the number 
of such organisations.  
3. To track the policing activities of these organisations, specifically the use of 
prosecutions. 
4. To identify the links between the policing organisations and governance. 
 
This research was unique in that no similar empirical mapping exercise had been 
undertaken.  It was very much an exploratory thesis to identity the policing entities of 
the Irish state outside of An Garda Síochána.   
 
1.3 Main Findings and Recommendations 
 
The research identified a total of 51 Irish state agencies, authorities, boards, 
commissions, government departments, institutes, offices, regulators and societies, all 
of which have actually taken a prosecution case through the Irish Courts for breach of 
the legislation or regulations under their care. The study also confirmed the rapid 
expansion of the number of these organisations throughout the last two decades.  While 
it is clearly evident that a wide variety of compliance and enforcement options are 
employed, there are indications that there has been a greater preponderance to select the 
prosecution option as an enforcement method, with long established organisations now 
prosecuting for the first time. 
 
1.4 Outline of Chapters 
 
Chapter two presents a review of the current literature on plural policing and includes an 
examination of the visibility of Irish State policing providers.  Chapter three details the 
research methodology and the rationale regarding the chosen approach.  The findings of 
the research are outlined in chapter four while chapter five provides an in-depth analysis 
and discussion of these findings, which are interpreted and considered with regard to the 
current literature.  Finally, chapter six outlines the conclusions and recommendations, 
which emanate from the research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines and evaluates the literature on plural policing.  It maps out the 
development and expansion of plural policing before considering the various ways 
states have adapted to a networked society.  The chapter then examines the possible 
future of plural policing before concluding with an exploration of the literature, which 
has specifically identified the existence and roles of a variety of policing providers.  
 
2.2 Background 
 
2.2.1 Police, Policing and Security: Defined 
 
An understanding of the terms police, policing and security is of paramount importance 
to any study of pluralised policing.  The police are one of many contributors to the 
maintenance of social order, uniquely situated at the most formal end of the social 
control spectrum.  They represent an organised form of order maintenance (Cohen, 
1995; Jones and Newburn, 1998), which involves ‘surveillance and sanctions’ 
(Newburn and Reiner, 2007:914).  But while the term public police is understood to 
mean the single entity of state police, public policing more correctly refers to all public 
or state agencies that perform policing duties.  Also, in the context of policing studies, 
the term ‘security’ is often given a wide meaning akin to crime control (Loader and 
Walker, 2007). 
 
However, defining policing is acknowledged as being problematic (Newburn, 2008) and 
associated terms are open to wide interpretation and misuse.  For example, the phrases 
public police and public policing are often incorrectly treated as having the same 
meaning.  This is clearly visible when Crawford (2006:461) graphs public “police”, 
which he limits to ‘sworn officers and community support officers’, when comparing 
the expanding numbers of “public policing” against the private sector.  By doing so, he 
incorrectly portrays police and policing as having the same meaning.  The word security 
is equally open to misunderstanding.  The term has many different meanings and is 
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often prone to a narrow interpretation of protection from harm.  The literature indicates 
that this narrow meaning has been adopted on occasion, especially in direct 
comparisons with the private security sector (Dupont and Wood, 2006; Johnston, 2006; 
Loader and Walker, 2007).  At other times, a wider definition encompassing crime 
control is applied (Loader and Walker, 2007).  Indeed, the term ‘security and policing’ 
is often used within plural policing discourse (Crawford, 2006; Ellison and O'Rawe, 
2010).  This phrase automatically links the two concepts but equally indicates that they 
have very different meanings.  However, the term ‘security governance’ is advanced to 
encompass all forms of policing as suggested by Johnston and Shearing (2003).   
 
2.2.2 Late Modern Transformations 
 
From the earliest social contract theorists, the security of every citizen has been 
intimately linked to the state with the image of Hobbes’ Leviathan representing an all-
powerful state (Hobbes, 1996; Locke, 1988).  The state reserved sole custody over the 
use of legitimate force (Weber, 1978) and was thus perceived to have primary 
responsibility for policing and citizen security.  At the same time, state appointed police 
were seen to monopolise policing (Johnston and Shearing, 2003) and although private 
security policing existed, it was very much subordinate to the public police (Crawford, 
2006) who enjoyed ‘a pivotal place’ in security matters (Loader and Sparks, 2007:79). 
 
But this state centred policing structure changed with the arrival of the late modernity 
age, which ushered in an array of transformations across all aspects of social life.  In 
policing terms, the bureaucratic state ‘command and control’ structure (Wood and 
Shearing, 2007:8), which had existed virtually unchallenged, was now being countered 
by new style networked governance that was replacing old style hierarchies (Crawford, 
2006).  Loader and Walker (2001) referred to this as ‘a progressive de-coupling of 
police and state’. 
 
This apparent shift towards plural policing was recognised as a central issue within 
criminology and police studies throughout the world (Jones and Newburn, 2006) with 
several authors raising concerns about legitimacy, accountability and fairness in this 
expanding pluralised policing network (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Loader and 
Walker, 2007; Reiner, 2010).  The literature also predicted that increased numbers of 
the population would be subjected to police type scrutiny (Shearing and Stenning 1983; 
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Wakefield, 2003; Zedner, 2004) with Zedner (2004) also forewarning of potential 
injustices caused by strikingly divergent policies of the different prosecution agencies. 
The warning issued by Johnston (2001) that diverse policing, if left unchecked may 
create a fragmented, ineffective, unjust and overly invasive system of policing is 
particularly stark.  Criminologists recognised that some empirical mapping had taken 
place but advocated a need for increased empirical data (Loader and Walker, 2007), 
which was described as being ‘rather thin’ (Dupont and Wood, 2006:241). 
 
2.2.3  From Police To Policing  
 
In this new pluralised environment, the police retained primary responsibility for 
deploying legitimate force but were now seen as just one of many security providers.  
As Newburn (2008) correctly observed, policing and the police were no longer 
synonymous.  This broader concept of policing, which included an assembly of formal 
social controls (Jones and Newburn, 1998) was aptly entitled ‘security governance’ by 
Shearing and Stenning (1981).  Individual policing entities (or nodes) then co-existed 
within this pluralised security quilt (Ericson, 1994) in what Newburn (2008) referred to 
as a proliferation of policing beyond the police.  Alongside state police, policing roles 
were now being discharged by a plethora of providers from the wider public sector, the 
commercial sector, voluntary groups and even the civilian population (Newburn, 2007).  
In a reference to Stan Cohen’s (1985) fishing metaphor, Shearing (2001) declared, ‘The 
net will be widened and thinned, but those fishing will not be exclusively state 
officials’.  Crawford and Lister (2004) and Johnston (2003) referred to an extended 
policing family while Jones and Newburn (2006:4) called this new environment ‘a 
policing patchwork’.  The public police were no longer the sole policing agent but 
instead a new multilateral security network had arisen (Bayley and Shearing, 2001). 
 
The literature identifies the extent of the change but while Bayley and Shearing 
announced a monumental end to the public monopoly of policing claiming that ‘one 
system of policing ended and another took its place’ (1996), many others have 
convincingly countered this claim by showing that crime control has never been 
exclusive to the state (Crawford, 2008; Garland, 1996; Jones and Newburn, 2006; 
Newburn, 2001; Reiner, 2010; Zedner, 2004).  Indeed, Zedner (2006) opined that 
pluralisation was nothing new, but simply a reversion back to eighteenth century 
policing; Braithwaite’s (2000) ‘night watchman state’, when crime control was very 
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much the business of non-state entities.  Despite these differing opinions and also the 
fact that the police still dominate our understanding of policing (Reiner, 2010), it would 
appear that there is widespread agreement that there now exists a diverse multiplicity of 
policing providers. 
 
2.3 The Expansion of Plural Policing 
 
2.3.1 Reasons for Expansion  
 
A number of explanations have been proffered as to why policing has pluralised.  
Crawford (2006) for example, has argued that the scope of the public police has been 
constrained by limited finances and others now provide these policing services.  
However, Jones and Newburn (2006) demonstrate that both police numbers and budgets 
have actually increased and they have claimed it is more accurate to talk about a 
demand-gap where the demands on public police increased more rapidly then the 
growth in police resources.  Another theory is that society has now concluded that the 
police and the wider criminal justice system have a limited capacity and that the police 
are simply ‘spread too thinly’ to cope with the levels of crime (Reiner, 2010:23).   
 
The changing nature of policing public and private spaces is also credited with the 
expansion of policing beyond state police.  Shearing and Stenning (1981) have 
contended that the growth in ‘mass private property’ such as shopping centres has 
created the greater demand for private security while Newburn (2007) claims that 
increased policing numbers is partly due to a formalisation of informal security 
governance positions such as bus conductors. 
 
The work of Mulcahy (2012) is particularly instructive when examining this question 
from a purely Irish perspective.  Mulcahy (2012) mapped out the governance of crime 
and security and illustrated the lack of demand for plural policing in Ireland.  He 
suggested that the Gardaí were deemed by the Irish public to be able to cope with 
existing crime levels, at least until the 1960s/1970s when increased crime statistics 
coupled with the arrival of heroin prompted a concerned general public as well as a 
sudden political interest in criminal justice matters. 
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2.3.2 Consequences of Plural Policing 
 
The literature indicates that the state itself has been weakened by the expansion of other 
policing providers.  The effect of globalising and localising forces (Newburn, 2007), 
privatisation and regulatory expansion (Braithwaite, 2000) were deemed to have caused 
a hollowing out of the state (Rhodes, 1994).  In contrast, several authors have applauded 
the increase in regulation claiming the state is actually strengthened, not weakened, by 
regulatory governance (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Rose and Miller, 1992; Shearing 
and Berg, 2006; Zedner, 2004).  The claim is that this rule-at-a-distance concept 
strengthens the state by extending state influence and governance (Rose and Miller, 
1992).  The state also benefits from the formation of alliances across various networks 
(Young, 2007).  In a similar context, it could be argued that global securitisation and the 
emergence of supranational institutions such as the European Police Office (Europol), 
which are seen to enhance policing capacity across Europe (Loader, 2002) either 
diminishes the role of the state as a sole policing provider or alternatively, actually 
increases the state’s power by uniting with its European partners.  
 
Another quite different consequence of pluralisation is a ‘blurring of the distinction’ 
(Zedner, 2004:3) between the state and civil society, and between public and private 
policing.  There is now a greater overlap in techniques and roles such as patrolling, 
investigation and the application of sanctions according to Morgan and Newburn 
(1997), Newburn (2008) and Shearing (2001).  
 
2.4 The Multiplicity of State Models 
 
It is widely accepted that states have relinquished some control over policing and that 
there has been a general shift from direct control to increased governance.  However, 
states appear to have adapted to pluralism in different ways, the work of Crawford 
(2006) and McLaughlin (2007) is particularly insightful.  Firstly, in some cases states 
have held on to their function as sole policing provider and in an act of ‘flexing their 
muscles’ (Bauman, 1999:50), they have increased public police powers and punitive 
laws in what Garland (2001) referred to as an act of denial.  In other cases the state has 
withdrawn completely and simply allowed market forces to apply (Hayek, 1988).  In 
addition, two other prominent models have evolved, both of which promote a network 
approach to policing.  These are (a) nodal governance, where various public and private 
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entities (or nodes) work together in equal partnership within networks and (b) anchored 
pluralism, where pluralism and networking thrive but where the state retains overall 
importance and effectively acts as the lead node.  Empirical research has identified that 
all of these models co-exist to form ‘a complex mosaic’ (Crawford et al., 2005:90).  The 
next section of this chapter provides a detailed consideration of these models. 
 
2.4.1 State withdrawal from Front-line Policing  
 
As outlined, one adaptation by the state was to accept that it was no longer the sole 
provider of security.  It then proceeded to assign responsibility for crime control to the 
private sector and the general public.  The concept of ‘responsibilisation’, which began 
its criminological origins with Michel Foucault (1977) and Stan Cohen (1985), allowed 
states to distribute ownership of crime control across many factions of society.  As 
crime became seen as inevitable (Garland, 2001), state strategy shifted to surveillance 
and crime prevention.  States actively encouraged others to participate in crime control 
and this effectively widened the security governance net.  Crawford (2008) referred to 
this as an explosion in crime initiatives focused upon prevention rather than cure.  
 
Another development in late modernity was the adoption of an American concept 
(Eisner, 2000) whereby states, in part as a result of new European Union legislation, 
shifted from direct rule to indirect rule by appointing independent regulatory agencies.  
The expansion of regulatory agencies, which maximise compliance-based law 
enforcement, is seen as an example of the risk society promoted by Ericson and 
Haggerty (1997).  Manning (2006:114) categorised the models of regulation as being: 
the criminal coercive model, the compliance-negotiation model and the co-operative 
model.  Braithwaite (2000), Crawford (2008) and Hardiman (2012) have all highlighted 
this expansion as being a very significant event, even prompting Braithwaite (2000) to 
declare that the ‘Keynesian State’ had now been replaced by the ‘New Regulatory 
State’.  In Irish terms, Westrup (2012) declared the increase in regulatory agencies to be 
perhaps the most significant change to Irish governance. 
 
However, in addition to state withdrawal, two dominant theoretical frameworks offer an 
alternative course of action.  These are described in the next section. 
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2.4.2 Nodal Governance 
 
Johnston, Shearing and Wood have written quite extensively in favour of the model of 
nodal governance, while Dupont, Burris and Berg are also proponents of this form of 
governance.  It is posited that while each individual constituent (or node) can operate in 
isolation it is only when they harness their knowledge and capacity and communicate 
across networks that they reach their true potential (Burris, 2004).  Under the nodal 
governance model, each node has equal standing and is part of a horizontal alliance 
joining forces in the spirit of cooperation (Johnston and Shearing, 2003).  The sovereign 
state is but one node within this ‘network of power’ (Shearing and Berg, 2006:194) and 
it holds no priority over others (Johnston and Shearing, 2003).  Indeed Shearing and 
Wood (2003) re-introduced the term ‘denizen’ to denote a person within a specific node 
rather than use the term ‘citizen’ with its obvious state related connotations.  Similarly 
Morgan and Newburn (1997:73) while recognising that the public police have an 
essential role in policing networks, question whether they should take ‘the lead part’.  
Shearing and Wood (2003:217) go further by seeking to establish nodal governance 
firmly within the community, maximising local knowledge and ability and thus creating 
what they call ‘community governance’. 
 
However, Thompson (2003) has warned of the demise of networks due to a retraction of 
policy making into hierarchies and also due to the expansion of privatisation and private 
sector techniques into public sector business.  Equally, these networks can be complex 
with the literature reporting a lack of co-ordination and effectiveness (Crawford, 2005; 
Verhage, Terpstra, Deelman, Muylaert and Van Parys, 2010; Zedner, 2004).  The 
solution to this may be to create co-ordinating structures such as super-structural nodes, 
which can act as command centres of networked governance (Drahos, 2004) or 
alternatively overarching policing commissions (Loader, 2000; Shearing, 2001).   
 
In practical terms the proponents of nodal governance often cite the two examples of the 
Zwelethemba Peace Committees in South Africa and the police boards established 
under the Patten Commission in Northern Ireland as actual examples of nodalisation at 
work.  However, Braithwaite (2000), Ellison and O’Rawe (2010), and Reiner (2010) 
have all claimed there are flaws within these examples.  Quoted Irish examples, include 
the Criminal Assets Bureau and local authority enforcement (Mulcahy, 2012) and the 
recently formed Joint Policing Committees (Harrington 2011). 
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2.4.3 State Anchored Pluralism 
 
In contrast, promoting an alternative to the nodalisation theoretical framework, Loader 
and Walker (2007:7) believe the state and public police are ‘indispensable’ and ‘pivotal’ 
to security governance and that the state could never be merely one of many equal 
nodes.  They cite expanding state powers as evidence that the state is very much centre 
stage in security governance matters.  They accept the concept of networks and declare 
there should be ‘as much pluralism as possible’ (Loader and Walker, 2007:193).  
However their version is what is termed ‘an anchored’ pluralist model where the state is 
the lead partner effectively retaining control over policing matters (Loader and Walker, 
2006:8). Braithwaite (2000), Crawford (2006), Marks and Goldsmith (2006), White 
(2011) and Zedner (2004) all support this concept. 
 
To support the idea that the state is an essential leading component of any network, 
Loader and Walker (2007:170) proffer the idea that security is a ‘thick public good’, 
which needs protection.  They advocate that security should not be a private commodity 
or ‘club good’, to be bought and sold and only available to those who can afford it 
(Loader and Walker, 2007:170).  In simple terms, they strongly believe that commercial 
interests conflict with public good interests.  In support of this argument Crawford 
(2006) graphically illustrated the difficulties experienced by London businesses in 
obtaining insurance following an IRA bombing in London in 1992.  In this case, the 
British government took action and acted as ‘an insurer of last resort’ demonstrating the 
need for the state (Crawford, 2006:459).  
 
2.5 The Future of Plural Policing  
 
The empirical evidence gathered by Jones and Newburn (2006) reveals that plural 
policing is developing across a number of jurisdictions and indeed continents.  With the 
exception of Greece, there has been a dramatic growth in the private security sector and 
a diversification of policing across ‘a complex patchwork of agencies’ (Jones and 
Newburn, 2006:34).  The literature indicates that this pluralised world of policing and 
security is set to continue as a general trend (Dupont and Wood, 2006), despite Yar’s 
(2011) warning that network governance, like its predecessors, could well be replaced 
by another mode of social co-ordination in due course.  However if plural policing is the 
future, the question is which model of security governance will flourish?  The answer to 
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this is debated in Wood and Dupont’s (2006) compilation ‘Democracy, Society and the 
Governance of Security’, which is an excellent compendium of the various academic 
opinions in this field of study.  While at first glance it appears the literature is simply 
divided between the two dominant theories of nodal governance and anchored 
pluralism, with the key difference between the two being the role of the state (White, 
2011), further investigation reveals that it is not a simple case of two factions opposed 
as pro and anti-state mentalities but rather the differences are much more subtle and can 
be quite nuanced.  
 
For example, the research literature clearly shows that both theories recognise the 
importance of the state.  Nodal governance proponents agree with Loader and Walker 
(2001), and acknowledge that the state should not be forgotten (Shearing and Berg, 
2006) and that it is a crucial player within governance (Johnston, 2006).  Equally, 
everyone appears to agree that there is a need to look beyond the state.  For example 
Shearing and Berg (2006) suggest that other non-state local entities should take 
responsibility for policing and security.  In contrast, for supporters of anchored 
pluralism, ‘beyond the state’ simply means bringing in more policing partners to work 
with the state in a pluralised world (Crawford, 2006). 
 
There appears to be some agreement on a number of other issues such as the importance 
of democracy.  However, both sides claim it is their particular model that best promotes 
democracy (Loader and Walker, 2001 and 2007; Wood and Shearing, 2007).  Equally, 
while Shearing (2006) agrees with the concept of anchored pluralism, he argues that 
pluralism has multiple state, supra state and non-state anchors and agrees to an anchor 
but just not a state anchor.    
 
2.6 Visibility of State Policing Providers 
 
While the transfer of traditional police functions to the private sector and to the general 
public dominates plural policing discourse, there is little discussion regarding the role of 
state bodies that actively perform policing functions.  The research literature reveals that 
there is a significant absence of any reference to these state entities, when estimating the 
size of public policing; with Zedner (2006) being one of the very few exceptions.  
However, there is now a growing awareness of these organisations and their importance 
is clearly recognised by Jones and Newburn (2006:4) who referred to them as being ‘a 
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significant element’ within the broader notion of plural policing.  Newburn and Reiner 
(2007) also declared that the increased attention paid to the activities of a range of 
governmental regulatory and investigatory agencies was one of the three key 
developments within pluralisation. 
 
Early recognition came when Newburn (2001) identified a variety of specialised 
policing providers.  He categorised environmental health officers, benefit fraud 
investigators and others under the title ‘Other public policing bodies’.  Later Jones and 
Newburn (2006) declared that local authorities actually performed a range of policing 
functions, and Gibson and Cavadino (2008:11) subsequently identified a number of 
‘investigators from other authorities’.  However, it was Crawford (2008) who produced 
the most comprehensive list of organisations involved in plural policing.  As part of 
this, his description of the reporting structures illustrated a complex government web of 
policing providers (Crawford, 2008). 
 
In an Irish context, Kilcommins, O’Donnell, O’Sullivan and Vaughan (2004), when 
reviewing the development of the criminal justice policy and practice in Ireland, 
documented some examples of prosecutions, seizures, warning letters and case details 
of offences ‘processed by other agencies’.  They mention the Revenue Commissioners, 
Health and Safety Authority (HSA), Office of Director of Corporate Enforcement 
(ODCE), Department of Social and Family Affairs, Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), Central and Regional Fisheries Board, Dublin Bus, local authorities, the Health 
Board and An Post as some examples of these organisations.  They observed that, 
  
society tends to be more concerned about the potential harms caused by drug 
addicts wielding knives or syringes than by businessmen signing dodgy deals 
(2004:102) 
 
Most recently, Westrup (2012) identified ten new Irish regulatory agencies, set up 
between 1991 and 2004, a number of which have a policing function.  However, this is 
only part of the picture as during the budget speech of 2009, the government announced 
the merger of a number of state agencies with a general plan to reduce the number of 
state bodies and agencies by forty-one (O'Toole and Dooney, 2009).  This reduction 
should be considered in conjunction with the examination of public sector trends by 
Boyle (2012) which highlighted that the largest decrease in staff numbers between 2008 
and 2012 was suffered by the non-commercial state agencies (19 per cent), local 
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authorities (14 per cent) and the justice sector (13 per cent).  In addition, MacCarthaigh 
reported that between April 2007 and April 2010, eight new state agencies were created 
while eighteen ceased to exist (2010). 
 
However, the reality is that the visibility of Irish policing providers is further obscured 
by the lack of meaningful crime data.  Irish literature consistently stresses the 
limitations of official crime figures (Kilcommins et al., 2004; Walsh and Mulqueen, 
2009) and calls for improvements in data collection and publication (Rogan, 2012). 
 
However the imminent introduction of a whole of government performance 
measurement portal, ‘Ireland Stat’, as described by Downes, Kennedy and Nic Gearailt 
(2013), which will allow the comparison of programme and policy outcomes across 
government bodies, has the potential to be a significant milestone in the visibility and 
transparency of state policing providers. 
 
2.7 Summary 
 
The research literature has highlighted that police and policing has gone through a 
transformation and that there is clear evidence of an expansion and diversity of those 
involved in policing.  In particular, the literature indicates that while the criminological 
discourse on state policing organisations is underdeveloped, there appears to be a 
growing awareness and appreciation of such state entities. The multiplicity of state 
models suggest that there has been a general shift from direct control to increased 
governance but while there is general agreement that networked or nodal governance is 
the future of policing, there is disagreement regarding the actual role the state should 
play in such networks.  Irish literature has particularly highlighted a constant change in 
those involved in plural policing together with a lack of meaningful crime data for the 
work of these organisations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the research methodology used to evaluate the 
overall aim of the study, which was to explore and produce a comprehensive empirical 
mapping of the policing organisations in existence in 2013 in Ireland.  The first section 
of this chapter outlines the philosophical element of the research and explains the 
rationale for the selected research design.  The research methods, data collection and 
sampling are then discussed.  The limitations and ethical issues to the research are 
highlighted in the final section.  
 
3.2 Research Design  
 
Research design and methods are based on different perceptions of reality (Fielding and 
Schreier, 2001), specifically, what is reality (ontology) and how is knowledge of this 
reality developed (epistemology).  The primary research crosses into both objective and 
subjective realms of ontology and the actual collection of data is based on a post-
positivism epistemology encompassing a numeric observation of the social world. 
 
The specific design selected for the research, which was influenced by the objective of 
the study did not fit neatly into any one paradigm.  The design could be best described 
as referencing the theory to the empirical data in an effort to establish if the theory was 
applicable to Ireland.  To achieve this, an amalgam of quantitative and qualitative 
methods was applied and as such the design falls into the wide net of a mixed methods 
design.  This approach is described as one where the researcher ‘draws inferences using 
both qualitative and quantitative approaches…in a single study’ (Tashakkori and 
Creswell, 2007:4). 
 
This research collected and analysed quantitative data to identify state organisations, 
acting in a policing capacity, and then subjected these results to a qualitative analysis.  
This approach concurs with Creswell and Clark who recognised the practicality of being 
‘free to use all methods possible to address a research problem’ (Creswell and Clark, 
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2011:13).  Although there are many good reasons for choosing a mixed method 
approach as illustrated by Creswell and Clark, (2011), the author’s specific reasons were 
to corroborate the results and to underpin the findings.  Quantitative research was 
necessary to identify the target group and evaluate any increase in the numbers.  The 
qualitative research methodology was used to analyse documentary data of the 
Oireachtas, organisational annual reports and prosecution policy material in order to 
enhance the understanding of these policing organisations. 
 
3.3 Research Methods, Data Collection and Sampling  
 
For the purpose of the research, the author confined the definition of state organisations 
involved in policing activities to include only organisations that prosecuted offenders 
for breach of Irish legislation.  With the ability to enforce such coercive powers these 
organisations are very much at the most formal end of the social control spectrum and 
were deemed to perform a policing function.  Zedner (2004), in referring to similar 
agents observed ‘as prosecuting bodies they fulfil a core criminal justice function’, 
while Newburn and Reiner (2007) emphasised the ability to impose sanctions as a 
defining element of the police.  Manning (2006:114) also categorised one of the models 
of regulation as being, a ‘criminal coercive model’. 
 
3.3.1 Phase 1: The Research Questionnaire 
 
The research method was strongly influenced by the difficulty in identifying the 
relevant policing organisations.  The author first examined the possibility of 
documenting the policing activities of these agencies by means of a documentary 
analysis of published annual and other official reports.  However, it was decided to 
issue a questionnaire to an identified target grouping to maximise the accuracy of the 
data.  This purposive sampling technique described as selecting cases ‘based on a 
specific purpose rather than randomly’ (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003:713), contributed 
to the accuracy of the research, however it did have a negative impact regarding 
efficiency due to the time involved when communicating in person.  The research 
included one hundred percent of the relevant organisations in the target sample.  Teddlie 
and Yu (2007:204) noted that this ‘complete collection’ or ‘criterion sampling’ while 
normally used in qualitative studies could also be used to generate numeric data. 
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In order to identify the potential organisations that might use coercive powers such as 
prosecution as part of their compliance activities, the author contacted a number of key 
offices within the Irish criminal justice system: the Chief State Solicitor’s Office 
(CSSO), DPP and the Courts Service of Ireland.  While the CSSO and the DPP 
confirmed that they did not maintain a list of prosecuting authorities, the Courts 
Information Office was able to identify all organisations that had previously taken a 
prosecution in the District Court.  While this historic list naturally included 
organisations that had ceased to exist, this method identified more than 40 potential 
prosecutors and acted as a solid foundation in identifying the target group. 
 
The researcher examined all government department websites and scrutinised two 
selected documents from MacCarthaigh (2009 and 2010), which identified commercial 
and non-commercial national level agencies.  The official websites of approximately 
100 organisations were then scanned for references to prosecutions.  Some 
organisations clearly stated that they did not prosecute but passed on investigations to 
An Garda Síochána.  Following this screening exercise a list containing 69 potential 
organisations was established.   
 
A pilot questionnaire was issued to four managers within the Revenue Commissioners 
(the author’s organisation) to test the instrument.  Valuable feedback was provided and 
the questionnaire was amended.  The questionnaire was drafted with closed-ended 
questions with predetermined response scales and restricted categories containing both 
binary and nominal variables.  A copy of the questionnaire is presented in Appendix B. 
 
The questionnaire was divided into three components.  The first component related to 
the structure, staffing levels and year of establishment.  The second component 
requested general information on prosecutions, legal advice, delegated authority, 
prosecution staff, powers and actual use of prosecutions.  The third component 
requested specific information on prosecutions including prosecution numbers, 
publication policy and type of offences prosecuted. As a preview of official publications 
indicated that prosecutions were recorded very differently across a number of 
organisations, the questionnaire sought to ensure a level of consistently by explicitly 
requesting details of cases actually prosecuted and finalised in a specific year.  
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The author initiated communications by telephoning the relevant information office or 
press officer.  This allowed for an explanation of the purpose of the research and 
succeeded in directing the questionnaire to the appropriate unit in most cases.  In 
another 12 cases the author issued e-mails to a generic information box.  A total of 69 
questionnaires were issued to all organisations in July and August 2013.  Reminder e-
mails were issued in 36 cases and follow up clarification telephone calls were made in 
nine cases.  A total of 62 (90%) organisations responded.  Of those returned, 15 
confirmed they did not prosecute while another five organisations, although 
prosecutors, chose not to complete the questionnaire.  Forty-two organisations in total 
completed the questionnaire. 
 
The researcher set the inclusion criteria for policing to be those organisations actually 
using the coercive powers at the most formal end of the social control spectrum.  Only 
organisations that had actually prosecuted offenders for breach of the legislation were 
deemed to be active in plural policing.  Three of those who completed a questionnaire 
stated they had not actually prosecuted even though they had the powers to do so.  
These questionnaires, which were received from the Central Bank, Property Services 
Regulatory Authority (PSRA) and the Railway Safety Commission (RSC), were 
subsequently withdrawn from the findings and analysis.  The 39 valid returned 
questionnaires represented 76% of the final identified target group. 
 
3.3.2 Phase II: Oireachtas 
 
The second phase of the research involved a documentary analysis of selected material 
generated by both houses of the Irish parliament between January and July 2013.  The 
purpose of this research phase was to assist in the identification of organisations and act 
as a further source of data in addition to the questionnaires.  Documentary analysis is a 
systematic procedure for evaluating documents, ‘in order to elicit meaning, gain 
understanding, and develop empirical knowledge’ (Bowen, 2009:27).  The reports from 
Dáil Éireann and Seanad Éireann included both written and oral Parliamentary 
Questions (PQ) and general debates.  This research method was selected because the 
national parliament (the Oireachtas) debates and passes all laws (O'Toole and Dooney, 
2009) and represents ‘the main authorizers of public security’ (Dupont, 2006:91). 
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The author utilised two web sites, to identify the number of times the term prosecution 
was used in conjunction with a named prosecuting organisation. The initial search 
criteria were ‘prosecution’ and variations of the word.  The search engines returned 444 
cases from www.KildareStreet.com and 455 cases from www.oireachtas.ie.  The 
difference of 2% was considered acceptable and this acted as a validation check for the 
search results.  The author used the cases returned by www.KildareStreet.com as this 
site allowed a direct link to individual cases unlike the Oireachtas website which links 
back to a full day’s business. 
 
3.3.3 Phase III: Courts Service 
 
This phase of the research was used to explore the level of policing activity, in terms of 
prosecutions, accredited to all policing providers.  The researcher scrutinised the 
statistics and annual reports (2011 and 2012) of the Courts Service of Ireland.  The 
examination focussed on the District court, as this court processed 95% of all criminal 
matters in 2012 including the vast majority of cases relevant to this study (Courts 
Service, Annual Report 2012).  
 
3.3.4 Local Authorities 
 
Local authorities were considered as part of the primary research as they were known to 
command a significant policing brief.  Under the Local Government Act 2001 the state 
is divided into 114 local authorities: twenty-nine county, five city and eighty town 
councils.  Each council is technically independent but forms part of the wider local 
government system.  The author therefore decided to treat this group as one single 
entity, similar to Garda Divisions all reporting into one organisation.  Indeed, O'Toole 
and Dooney (2009:240) have opined ‘in many ways the local authority service is a 
single service’.  The issue of a questionnaire to this group was deemed impractical but 
in an attempt to quantify the level of prosecution work undertaken by local authorities, 
the author contacted the Department of Environment, Community and Local 
Government (DECLG) and also the Local Government Management Agency (LGMA). 
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3.4 Data Preparation and Analysis 
 
3.3.3 Questionnaire 
 
The data was carefully collated and analysed to ensure the quality of both ‘the scores’ 
and ‘the conclusions’ (Creswell and Clark, 2011:210).  While, the data was pre-coded, 
there was an element of post-data collection coding.  The data was analysed using Excel 
and missing values and contradictory entries were minimised by telephoning the named 
contact person returned on the questionnaire.  This occurred in nine of the 42 
questionnaires returned and thus maximised the quality and accuracy of the data in the 
research.  However, it was necessary to omit certain organisations from the analysis of 
specific questions where a missing or invalid entry remained, for example, the number 
of prosecutions returned by the Loughs Agency included prosecutions in both Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 
 
While 12 potential prosecuting authorities did not complete the questionnaire it was 
possible, via the Courts Service, organisational websites and annual reports, to confirm 
that 11 of them performed a prosecutorial role.  These additional named organisations 
were included on the list of prosecutors and two of them, the Companies Registration 
Office (CRO) and the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland (PSI)) were included in the 
prosecution statistics as such details were very obvious in their respective annual 
reports.  Any information sourced in this way is clearly identified in the relevant tables.  
This resulted in the identification of 50 organisations and a final total of 51 
organisations with the inclusion of local authorities, which were counted as a single 
entity.  The high number of policing organisations in the sample (76%) authenticates the 
validity and reliability of the research.  
 
3.3.4 Oireachtas 
 
The 444 cases, which were identified using www.KildareStreet.com, were screened to 
isolate only those cases that specifically made a reference to an identified organisation 
other than An Garda Síochána and only then where the organisation was mentioned in 
enforcement, coercive or regulatory roles, that is, their policing role.  A casual mention 
of an individual organisation was excluded.  This generated 159 reference reports, 
which were then subjected to an in-depth evaluation noting key issues and patterns.  
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These key issues were then clustered or coded (Bell, 2005) and conclusions and theories 
were extracted.  
 
The documentary analysis revealed prosecution statistics for An Post, the EPA and the 
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission (GSOC), all of which agreed very closely 
with the prosecution figures returned on the questionnaire and thus acted as another 
validation check (PQ 1808/13; PQ 3705/13; Dáil debates, 2 May 2013). 
 
3.4 Data Limitations: 
 
The main limitation of the research is that it is not possible to confirm if every 
individual policing (prosecuting) authority has been captured within the study.  Equally 
not all those identified as target respondents completed the questionnaire, with a small 
number being reluctant or unable to do so.  Equally a small number of questionnaires 
were returned with some uncompleted questions.  Another limitation is the meaning of 
the term ‘prosecuted’ and the different counting rules used by organisations when 
reporting prosecution statistics. 
 
3.5 Ethical Issues  
 
The ethical codes of both Dublin Institute of Technology and the Sociological 
Association of Ireland were used as a guiding framework of principles throughout the 
research.  The researcher was particularly cognisant of the importance of informed 
consent and the need not to cause harm to any participants (O’Leary, 2004).  To ensure 
informed consent, the researcher issued a detailed introductory letter (Appendix A) with 
each questionnaire (Appendix B) clearly outlining the nature of the study.  There was a 
strong emphasise on only gathering information that was already in the public domain.   
 
The questionnaire also included ‘opt-out’ choices to safeguard the operational interests 
of the respondents if required. It is significant that ten different agencies availed of this 
option.  As such, the questionnaire was designed to elicit maximum information but also 
to safeguard the interests of those replying.  While details of Oireachtas business are a 
matter of public record and the ethical concerns are, therefore, considerably lessened, 
the author has nevertheless ensured the accuracy of the information reproduced. 
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3.7 Summary 
 
This chapter has justified the approach to the research.  It has outlined the rationale for a 
mixed method design and has presented the argument for selecting a questionnaire as 
the primary method of data collection. The chapter also explained the rationale for the 
documentary analysis of Oireachtas reports and how the information was gathered and 
analysed.  It provided a comprehensive description as to how the target group was 
identified and contacted, and clearly outlined the rationale for the inclusion or deliberate 
omission of certain information.  Finally, the author has outlined the data limitations 
and the relevant ethical issues. 
 
The next chapter presents the findings, which resulted from the questionnaire and the 
documentary analysis of Oireachtas reports, Courts Service and official publications. 
 33 
CHAPTER 4 
 
4.  RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the information elicited from the questionnaires, the documentary 
analysis of the Oireachtas reports, the Courts Service and official publications.  The 
chapter examines the relevant District court statistics and provides an insight into the 
level of prosecutions undertaken nationally by all policing organisations.  Key trends 
are highlighted and charted throughout the chapter. 
 
4.2 Ireland’s Policing Authorities  
 
4.2.1 Identification  
 
The questionnaire asked respondents to confirm if they had the authority to prosecute in 
their own name (Q.10) and also to confirm the year of the first prosecution (Q.11).  
Thirty-seven of the 39 respondents to the questionnaire confirmed they had delegated 
authority and could initiate prosecutions in their own name or the name of the minister.  
The other two organisations, GSOC and the Sea Fisheries Protection Authority (SFPA), 
confirmed they investigated cases and forwarded them directly to the DPP for 
consideration of prosecution (without an intervention from An Garda Síochána).  As a 
matter of standing practice, cases from the Revenue Commissioners are also taken in the 
name of the DPP.  The primary research also identified another 12 prosecuting 
organisations via data analysis of official publications and from the Courts Service 
(these cases are marked as * on Table 1).  A total of 51 individual prosecuting 
authorities (Table 1) were therefore identified.  By definition these 51 organisations 
perform a coercive policing role within the Irish state, alongside An Garda Síochána and 
can therefore be categorised as Ireland’s other policing providers.   
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Table 1 - Irish State Policing (Prosecuting) Authorities 
Organisation Year Est. 
An Post 1984 
Bus Éireann* 1987 
Central Statistics Office 1949 
Commission for Aviation Regulation 2001 
Commission for Communications Regulation* 2002 
Commission for Energy Regulation 1999 
Companies Registration Office* 1922 
Competition Authority 1991 
Data Protection Commissioner 1989 
Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine 1897 
Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht (NPWS)  2009 
Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources* 2007 
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government* 1919 
Department of Health* 1947 
Department of Social Protection 1947 
Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport 1959 
Drogheda Port Company* 1997 
Dublin Bus 1952 
Electricity Supply Board 1927 
Environmental Protection Agency 1993 
Fáilte Ireland* 2003 
Food Safety Authority of Ireland 1999 
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission 2007 
Health and Safety Authority 1989 
Health Service Executive* 2005 
Iarnród Éireann 1946 
Inland Fisheries Ireland 1852 
Irish Aviation Authority 1993 
Irish Medicines Board 1996 
Local Authorities* 1898 
Loughs Agency 1952 
Luas 2004 
National Consumer Agency 2007 
National Education Welfare Board 2002 
National Employment Rights Authority 2007 
National Milk Agency 1994 
National Tobacco Control Office (HSE) 2010 
National Transport Authority 2003 
NSAI Legal Metrology Service 1996 
Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement 2001 
Office of the Revenue Commissioners 1923 
Pensions Board 1990 
Pensions Ombudsman 2003 
Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland* 2007 
Plant Variety Development Office* 1977 
Private Residential Tenancies Board 2004 
Private Security Authority 2004 
Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland 1992 
Road Safety Authority 2006 
Sea Fisheries Protection Authority 2007 
Veterinary Council of Ireland 1931 
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While not covered by the questionnaire, local authorities merit a specific mention, due 
to the high number of councils that are active in the field of prosecutions.  The DECLG 
clarified that the 114 local authorities reported into various departments, including 
DECLG, Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport (DTTaS) and Department of 
Jobs, Enterprise & Innovation (DJEI), and that no all-inclusive statistics were 
maintained by their department.  However, the LGMA explained that in reality only 88 
of the 114 local authorities (the rating authorities) actively enforce and prosecute 
offences. 
 
Figure 1 – Structure of Policing Authorities 
Structure of Policing Authorities
47%
15%
10%
10%
3%
15%
Regulatory Bodies State sponsored bodies: Non-Commercial
State sponsored bodies: Commercial Government Departments    
Health Authority Other
 
The questionnaire asked respondents to confirm the structure of the organisation (Q.4), 
the results of which are presented in Figure 1.  The organisations include a mixture of 
government departments, state sponsored commercial and non-commercial bodies, 
health authorities and regulatory bodies.  However, the research established that the 
majority of these organisations (47%) are dedicated regulatory bodies.  The ‘other’ 
category includes a combination of stand-alone offices (Central Statistics Office and the 
Revenue Commissioners), recognised agencies working within a government 
department (NERA and the National Parks & Wildlife Service (NPWS), a cross-border 
agency (Loughs agency), a private company (Transdev Ireland - the Luas operator) and 
finally the National Milk Agency.  
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4.2.2 Characteristics 
 
The questionnaire asked respondents to confirm the size of the organisation (Q.6).  
Almost half of the organisations reported a staffing level of more than 250 
personnel while seven reported a staffing level in excess of 2,500 (Figure 2). 
However, enforcement is only one activity of these organisations evidenced by the 
fact that only five organisations reported that ten or more staff were dedicated to 
prosecution work alone (Q.7) with almost 50% having no full-time staff assigned to 
such a function. 
 
            Figure 2 – Size of Policing Organisation (Staff Numbers) 
       
Size of Organisation (Staff Numbers)
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18%
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The questionnaire (Q.5) confirmed that the majority of prosecuting organisations report 
into a government department (Figure 3).  The three organisations, which do not report 
into a government department, are the Commission for Energy Regulation, GSOC and 
the National Tobacco Control Office of the Health Service Executive (NTCO-HSE).  
The 51 prosecuting entities include a total of seven government departments (four 
confirmed by questionnaire plus three confirmed by official publications). 
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  Figure 3 – Reporting Structures - Overview 
Oversight by Government Departments
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The study shows that of the 32 policing organisations reporting into a government 
department, the majority report into DTTaS (seven organisations, all specifically 
transport related) and into DJEI (6 organisations) as presented in Figure 4. 
 
 
     Figure 4 – Reporting Structures – Departmental level 
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The questionnaire also included a number of requests for information on prosecution 
related issues and the results of these are presented below.  When asked to quantify the 
number of staff who are dedicated solely to criminal prosecution work, ten of the 39 
respondents (24%) chose not to publicise exact numbers.  Also when asked if their 
organisation had a dedicated centrally located Criminal Prosecution Unit, three 
respondents also chose not to comment.  In a similar context, 20 organisations 
confirmed that they do not publish prosecution statistics on their website.  
 
Figure 5 – The Publication of Prosecution Case Details 
 The Publication of Prosecution Cases 
48% 
18% 
34% 
All cases Selected cases   No details 
published 
 
 
 
Twenty (52%) prosecuting organisat-
ions stated they published actual case 
details of all or selected cases while 18 
(48%) did not publish individual 
personal details (Figure 5). 
 
 
 
As a broad indicator as to how central a 
prosecution or policing role is to these 
organisations the research established that of 
the 39 respondents, 14 (37%) organisations 
had a dedicated centrally located criminal 
prosecution unit; 22 (56%) had access to an 
internal legal team (Figure 6) and 30 (77%) 
organisations were granted the power to 
initiate prosecutions automatically on 
establishment of the organisation. 
 
Figure 6 – Access to Legal Advice 
Legal Advice Available to Prosecuting Bodies
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4.2.3 Visibility 
 
The documentary analysis of the Oireachtas reports and Courts Service annual reports 
demonstrated the level of visibility of these organisations within the criminal justice 
system. Firstly, the documentary analysis of the Oireachtas reports revealed that Irish 
politicians used the phrase prosecution during 444 items of business between January 
and July 2013 while sitting in Dáil or Seanad Éireann. More than one third of these 
parliamentary questions and debates discussed or made reference to one or more non-
Garda organisations performing a policing type function within the state as defined by 
the use of prosecution (Table 2). 
               
               Table 2 - References to non-Garda Policing Organisations in the Oireachtas  
Month 
 
Total number of 
references to prosecutions 
References to non-
Garda agencies 
% 
 
Jan 43 22 51% 
Feb 66 21 32% 
Mar 49 15 31% 
Apr 34 15 44% 
May 71 28 39% 
June 91 23 25% 
July 90 35 39% 
 444 159 36% 
 
The research verified the most topical non-Garda policing items discussed in the 
Oireachtas during 2013.  The most frequently mentioned topics are presented in 
Table 3 below. 
Table 3 - Topics mentioned in the Oireachtas 
 (Jan - Jul 2013) 
Organisation Topic Total 
HSE Child Care 16 
Revenue  Tobacco Fraud 15 
DAFM Horse Related Issues 14 
ODCE Banking Crisis / Investigations 12 
Revenue  Fuel Fraud 9 
Central Bank Banking Crisis / Investigations 7 
DAFM Animal Welfare/Disease Issues 6 
Revenue  Tax Avoidance / Compliance 6 
NTA Taxi Regulation Bill 2012 6 
Local Authorities Illegal Dumping 5 
DAHG Wildlife Protection 5 
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The overall finding was that from the period January to July 2013 a total of 25 
individual organisations were mentioned 209 times within 159 questions and debates. 
 
 
 
 
                     Table 4 - Prosecuting Organisations mentioned in the Oireachtas 
                                                          (Jan - Jul 2013) 
Organisation Total 
Revenue Commissioners  52 
Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine 25 
Health Service Executive 21 
Local Authorities 17 
Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement 14 
Department of Social Protection 13 
Central Bank of Ireland 11 
Environmental Protection Agency 9 
National Transport Authority 8 
Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht 7 
National Employment Rights Authority 6 
Food Safety Authority of Ireland 4 
Private Residential Tenancies Board 4 
Sea Fisheries Protection Authority 3 
Companies Registration Office 2 
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission 2 
Irish Medicines Board 2 
National Tobacco Control Office 2 
An Post 1 
Dept. of Comms, Energy and Natural Resources 1 
Department of Health 1 
Inland Fisheries Ireland 1 
NSAI Legal Metrology Service 1 
Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland 1 
Private Security Authority 1 
Total 209 
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An examination of the annual reports and statistics produced by the Courts Service 
illustrated that a total of 400,911 orders (various sanctions) were made in respect of 
372,706 offences before the District Criminal Court in 2012 (Courts Service, 2012).  
These statistics indicate the prosecution work undertaken by all policing bodies.  While 
An Garda Síochána is naturally responsible for the majority of prosecutions, the 
category with the second highest number of orders (68,768) is described as ‘offences 
such as breach of bail, litter offences, street trading and offences prosecuted by 
government departments and other State agencies such as the Health and Safety 
Authority’ (Table 5).  
 
                                   Table 5 - District Court Orders 2008 to 2012    
District Court Orders 2008 to 2012 
Year Total Orders ‘Other’ Category 
2008 550,694 74,579 
2009 521,058 72,466 
2010 498,672 70,528 
2011 468,525 73,773 
2012 400,911 68,768 
 
 
If the total number of road traffic offences (RTOs) are excluded the significance of the 
other category becomes even greater (Table 6).  The reasoning for excluding the road 
traffic offences is because this single category of offences at 59% of all orders 
overshadows all other court business.  It is also notable that 45% of all road traffic 
offences were struck out in both 2011 and 2012.  
 
                    Table 6 - District Court Orders excluding RTOs - 2008 to 2012 
District Court Orders excluding RTOs - 2008 to 2012 
Year Total Orders Excluding RTOs 
Listed Garda 
Orders* 
‘Other’ 
Category 
2008 192,323 117,744 74,579 
2009 187,897 115,431 72,466 
2010 185,107 114,579 70,528 
2011 188,268 114,495 73,773 
2012 167,677 98,909 68,768 
 
          
 * These are predominantly public order / assault; drugs; theft; and sexual offences. 
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Table 7 graphs the number of orders in the ‘other’ category as a percentage of the total 
number of orders (blue) and also as a percentage of the total number of orders excluding 
RTOs (red). 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – Percentage of District Court orders classified as “other”. 
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4.3 The Expansion of Policing 
 
4.3.1 The Growth of Irish Policing Providers 
 
The questionnaire (Q.2, Q.11 and Q12) gathered details regarding three relevant time 
periods in the lifespan of each organisation: the year it was established; the year it was 
granted the power to prosecute; and the year when the first case was actually 
prosecuted.  Figure 8 graphs the year of establishment of the 51 policing organisations 
clearly indicating that 31 (61%) were established post 1990. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 – Policing Organisations - Year Established 
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Figure 9 illustrates a comparison across the four respondents with the greatest time 
period between the year established and the year of first prosecution.   
 
Figure 9 – Date of Establishment v. Use of Prosecution Powers  
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Figure 10 illustrates a selection of ten organisations with the greatest time period 
between the year a prosecution power was available to the organisation and the year it 
was first used. 
     
Figure 10 – Availability v. Use of Prosecution Powers  
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4.3.2 Reasons for Expansion 
 
The questionnaire (Q.13) confirmed that An Garda Síochána had previously 
investigated and prosecuted offences, or at least similar offences, that were now under 
the responsibility of nine identified policing organisations. The LMS (NSAI) 
commented that the power had been ‘civilianised’.  Also from question 13, 28 
organisations stated that neither An Garda Síochána nor any other agency had 
previously prosecuted similar offences that were now under their responsibility. 
 
The documentary analysis of Oireachtas reports identified three possible reasons for an 
expansion in the number of agencies.  These were: 
a) The imposition of EU Directives (PQ 27470/13). 
b) Political distancing (PQ 26289/13 and PQ 19033/13). 
c) Political calls for greater action including ‘increased prosecutions’ (Seanad 
debates, 2 July 2013), ‘tougher inspections’ (PQ 27635/13) and ‘stronger 
sanctions’ (Dáil debates, 29 May 2013). 
 
4.4 Policing Activities 
 
4.4.1 Level of Policing 
 
The documentary analysis of Oireachtas reports indicated a variety of policing activities 
carried on by these organisations.  Table 7 presents a sample of this work. 
 
Table 7 – Policing Activities 
Organisation Actions Reference 
CRO Struck off 38,284 companies between 2008 and 2013. PQ 31797/13 
DSP Interviewed almost 8,500 people at over 200 vehicle 
checkpoints between 2010 and 2012. 
Dáil debates, 
9 July 2013 
FSAI Implement over 10,000 inspections per annum for food 
labelling legislation. 
PQ 14590/13 
PRTB Contacted over 43,000 unregistered landlords in 2012. Dáil debates, 
24 Jan 2013 
Revenue 537,000 compliance interventions, yielding a total of 
€492 million for the exchequer. 
PQ 15094/13 
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The criminal aspect of those dealt with by some organisations is very evident with lists 
of firearms, bullets and offensive weapons seized (PQ 4149/13) and reports of physical 
assaults on members of staff (PQ 32315/13). 
 
The importance of the policing role of Irish state authorities was dramatically 
showcased when the FSAI uncovered a European wide practice of mislabelling meat 
products, which actually contained equine DNA or put simply, horsemeat. The 
revelation generated an investigation, which has since expanded beyond Europe (Dáil 
debates, 14 March 2013). 
 
4.4.2 Use of Prosecution Powers 
 
The research indicates that most policing authorities operate what the NTA referred to 
as ‘a graduated approach’ (Dáil debates, 16 May 2013) whereby a range of alternative 
options are considered before opting for the prosecution route.  These include education, 
preventative high visibility patrols, licensing, late filing charges, penalties, interest and 
publication of names.  An example of this is the acceptance of ‘compromise penalties’ 
by the Revenue Commissioners, which has resulted in approximately 80% of the annual 
1,000 detections of the illegal use of marked mineral oil, being settled outside of the 
formal criminal justice system (PQ 16805/13).  Another example is the application of 
late filing penalties by the CRO, which appears to have successfully reduced late filing 
of company returns from 87% in 2001 to just 12% in 2010. 
 
The primary research identified actual prosecution numbers for 37 organisations for 
2011 (13,474 prosecutions) and 2012 (14,480 prosecutions).  A detailed table listing 
these prosecutions is included at Appendix D.  In addition, the main, (although not all), 
prosecution statistics for local authorities were also quantified.  Firstly, a comprehensive 
statistical report produced by the LGMA (2013), indicated that local authorities secured 
527 prosecutions nationally under the litter Acts and another 676 prosecutions 
nationally under planning enforcement.  A separate report published by the DECLG 
(2013) quantified the number of prosecutions under the Control of Dogs Acts at 133 for 
2011.  Together the findings quantified the number of prosecutions by all 38 
organisations to be approximately 15,000 prosecutions for 2011. 
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However, the research also identified a number of organisations that have the power to 
prosecute but do not or have had no cause to use such a power to date (Table 8). 
 
          Table 8 - Organisations with unused Prosecuting Powers 
Organisation  
An Coimisineir Teanga 
Bord Gáis 
Central Bank 
Property Services Regulatory Authority 
Railway Safety Commission 
Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland 
 
 
Details of the organisations which were responsible for the largest number of 
prosecutions in 2012 are presented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 – 2012 Prosecutions 
 
Organisation 2012 
An Post 11,500 
Office of the Revenue Commissioners 1,517 
Data Protection Commissioner 195 
Road Safety Authority 182 
Iarnród Éireann 156 
Dublin Bus 147 
 
 
The research also identified that there were significant increases for some organisations 
in the numbers of prosecutions between 2011 and 2012 (Table 10). 
 
       Table 10 – Prosecution increases 2011 v 2012 
Organisation Increase 
Electricity Supply Board 320% 
Data Protection Commissioner 261% 
Dublin Bus 130% 
Sea Fisheries Protection Authority 117% 
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4.4.3 Networks 
 
The documentary analysis indicated that organisations often work very closely with 
others as part of their policing role.  Examples of close cooperation with An Garda 
Síochána (PQ 27635/13; PQ 32154/13; PQ 36688/13) and other agencies (PQ 16987/13; 
PQ 18542/13; PQ 22804/13; Dáil debates, 11 June 2013; Dáil debates, 9 July 2013) are 
well documented. 
 
4.4.4 Crime Data 
 
The primary research confirmed that no central list of prosecutors is held anywhere in 
Ireland.  The research also established that no crime data is specifically collected or 
published for individual or collective groups of non-Garda organisations acting in a 
policing role. Neither the CSO nor the Courts Service publishes individual statistics on 
state policing organisations. 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
The chapter identified 51 organisations operating alongside An Garda Síochána and 
clearly demonstrated the expansion of the number of such organisations over the last 
two decades.  The structure, staffing levels and governance of these policing 
organisations were analysed, highlighting that the majority of policing organisations 
report into a government department. The chapter included an in-depth examination of 
prosecution activity identifying prosecution statistics and trends, publication policies 
and noting a greater preponderance to select the prosecution option as an enforcement 
method, with long established organisations now prosecuting for the first time.  The 
research also highlighted that some organisations have the power to prosecute but do 
not exercise such a power.  The existence of networks was also confirmed and 
information was provided on level of visibility of these organisations in the Oireachtas 
and in District court statistics. 
 
The next chapter provides discussion on these findings. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
 
5.  ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the findings and considers what the research reveals about 
policing within the context of Irish state organisations.  The chapter also highlights 
where there is concurrence and disparity between the data collected and the current 
literature. 
 
5.2 Ireland’s Policing Authorities  
 
5.2.1 Identification 
 
The study succeeded in empirically mapping Irish state organisations operating in a 
policing role.  The research determined that this group of policing authorities is as 
varied in organisational structure as it is in diversity of roles.  The organisations include 
a wide mixture of government departments, state sponsored commercial and non-
commercial bodies, health authorities and regulatory bodies.  This diversity concurs 
with the literature, which referred to ‘a complex constellation of agencies’ 
(MacCarthaigh, 2010:20).  A closer examination of the structures reveals that one of the 
organisations listed is actually a private entity empowered to prosecute as the operator 
of Ireland’s Luas transportation system.  This entity, Transdev Ireland, operates the 
Luas on behalf of the Railway Procurement Agency and in addition to fare evasion; 
their security and compliance team are quite active in securing prosecutions for anti-
social behaviour.  Also, in a true example of transnational policing, the Loughs Agency, 
being one of eight north/south bodies established under the Good Friday agreement, 
prosecutes offenders in their country of residence regardless of whether the offence 
occurred north or south of the Irish border. 
 
The study has discovered six organisations that have the power to prosecute but which 
have not exercised such a power.  In actual fact, there may be many more such 
organisations but the only means of establishing the extent of such a group would be by 
way of a comprehensive review of all Irish legislation, a possible topic for future 
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research.  The research also discovered that at least one organisation in Ireland operates 
without prosecution powers while its equivalent in the United Kingdom is very active in 
terms of prosecutions.  The ISPCA is actively involved in investigations but then refers 
cases on to An Garda Síochána who take responsibility for prosecutions.  This contrasts 
with the RSPCA, which is the second largest prosecuting authority in the U.K.; second 
only to the Crown Prosecution Service itself (Rayner, 2013), with 1,552 individuals 
convicted in 2012 (RSPCA Prosecutions Annual Report 2012).  
 
5.2.2 State of Flux 
 
An examination of the literature and the findings reveals that the collective group of 
active policing organisations operating in the Irish state is subject to a state of constant 
flux.  The research has identified a number of organisations, which prosecute 
sporadically, for example, six of the organisations listed as prosecutors in Appendix D 
did not take a prosecution in one or both of the years examined.  In addition, the 
literature indicates a possible decrease in policing activity with the merger of state 
agencies and significant staff reductions throughout these organisations (Boyle, 2012; 
MacCarthaigh, 2010; O'Toole and Dooney, 2009).   
 
However, the research has confirmed that the Veterinary Council of Ireland, despite 
being in existence since 1931, has only as recently as January 2013, prosecuted its first 
case.  It was also confirmed that Bord Gáis, although presently not a prosecutor, is in 
the process of establishing a revenue protection unit and expects to commence 
prosecutions in the near future.  Likewise the enforcement units of the Central Bank and 
the Property Services Regulatory Authority are very new, having been established in 
2010 and it is expected that both of these organisations will invoke prosecution powers 
at a future date.  Both the literature and the primary research therefore indicate that this 
policing group is subject to constant change.  This may be a main contributing factor as 
to why there is no central list of prosecuting organisations and why the literature 
presents no comprehensive data on these organisations. 
  
5.2.3 Regulatory Bodies  
 
The research shows that Ireland has adapted the rule-at-a-distance concept applauded by 
Eisner, (2000) and has enthusiastically embraced the world of regulatory governance.  
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The study found that regulators accounted for 47% (18 of 39) of the respondents.  This 
is very much in keeping with other countries and is in line with Braithwaite’s (2000) 
declaration of the existence of a ‘New Regulatory State’.  As the state retains control 
with the majority of prosecuting organisations reporting into a government department 
it would seem that for Ireland, regulation does actually strengthen the state as acclaimed 
throughout the literature (Shearing and Berg, 2006; Zedner, 2004). 
 
5.2.4 Visibility  
 
It is significant that only 25 of the 51 identified policing organisations received a 
mention in Oireachtas reports in relation to their prosecuting role.  This statistic 
identifies the lack of visibility of this group and prompts the question as to why 
organisations were not mentioned in such a capacity.  Is it simply that there has been no 
question regarding their enforcement roles or alternatively that there is little knowledge 
of the prosecutions undertaken by their organisations. 
 
This lack of acknowledgement of the work of these organisations is equally evident in 
the statistics produced by the District court.  Despite the fact that these 51 policing 
organisations are part of a category that now accounts for 17.2% of all District Court 
orders (or over 40% percent when road traffic offences are excluded), they still do not 
merit a category of their own.  As a result there are no separate District court statistics 
which display the prosecution work of these organisations.  In this respect, Ireland is no 
different to others and seems to concur, rather unfortunately, with Newburn’s 
(2001:834) description of the UK equivalents as being ‘longstanding, if usually ignored, 
components of local policing structures.’  
  
5.3 The Expansion of Plural Policing  
 
5.3.1 The Growth of Irish Policing Providers 
 
The research clearly demonstrates an expansion in the number of policing organisations 
and reveals that Ireland is in keeping with other countries in terms of overall change and 
increased plural policing.  The transformation represents an increased fragmentation of 
policing and is in line with the dominant discourse which ‘privileges change over 
continuity” (Newburn, 2001:844). 
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The study revealed that 31 (61%) of the identified prosecuting organisations were 
established post 1990 and this concurs with the findings of Hardiman and Scott (2010) 
regarding a dramatic increase in the number of state organisations but more importantly 
supports the earlier study by McGauran, Verhoest and Humphreys (2005), which 
estimated that over 60% of all national agencies were established post 1990.  The high 
number of agencies could well be considered an example of Giddens (1990) warning 
that the momentum of change was so great that it reflected ‘a runaway world’.  
Alternatively, this rapid change may have simply been an increased awareness of the 
need for additional specialised policing organisations.  
 
The expansion and diversity of state policing providers identified by the research 
certainly conforms to McLaughlin’s (2007) declaration regarding nodal governance that 
‘as you move through different space, you are governed by different sets of state and 
non-state agencies’.  This research has empirically mapped the Irish state agencies that 
occupy some of the space referred to by McLaughlin (2007).  This increase would also 
appear to be an example of the state reaction to pluralism, described by Bauman (1999) 
as a flexing of muscles and by Garland (2001) as an act of an act of denial.  Indeed, it 
might be apt to ask if the findings of the research are evidence of Garland’s (2001) 
theory of a culture of control.  The expansion in Ireland’s policing organisations would 
seem to support his claims that increasing numbers within society were being placed 
under the supervision of the justice system.   
 
A closer examination of the research findings reveals that the expansion of 
organisations into the field of prosecution is an even more recent event than first 
considered.  A more accurate approach to identifying the arrival of a new prosecuting 
(and by definition policing) authorities is to map out, not the year established, but rather 
the year in which the power to prosecute was granted or even more appropriate the year 
of the first prosecution.  Both of these are a more accurate indicator of active 
involvement in plural policing.  This point is illustrated in the research by a comparison 
of the four respondents with the greatest time period between the year established and 
the year of first prosecution.  While the organisations were formed between 1931 and 
1952, the first prosecutions were not taken until 1978, 1993, 1996 and 2013. This shows 
that a number of organisations which were established pre-1990 have actually only 
entered the world of plural policing quite recently.  
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While there is clear evidence of an expansion of the number of policing organisations, 
the research also reveals an expansion of policing within organisations.  The PQ 
7979/13 demonstrates that large numbers of Irish citizens are now routinely policed by 
state organisations.  It discloses that the number of interventions by the Revenue 
Commissioners has increased from 189,690 in 2006 to 537,822 in 2012 but that the 
associated monetary yield actually decreased from €691m in 2006 to €492m in 2012.  
This would appear to be a perfect example of Shearing’s (2001) prediction that there 
would be a wider net catching smaller fish.  But policing here is extended not outside 
the state as predicted, but rather across to other state officials.  
 
5.3.2 Reasons for Expansion 
 
The research concurs with the literature in part, identifying EU directives as one 
possible reason for the expansion of policing (MacCarthaigh, 2010; O'Toole and 
Dooney, 2009).  However, there is no evidence of a lack of funding or a loss of faith in 
the police or criminal justice system as possible reasons for a transfer of traditional 
policing roles to new immerging organisations.  While the research clearly shows a 
transfer of tasking from An Garda Síochána to other policing organisations, it may 
simply be that the Irish state and its agencies have evolved to address the growing 
diversity of crime.  This is evidenced by the fact that 28 organisations (74% of 
respondents) stated that neither An Garda Síochána nor any other agency had previously 
prosecuted similar offences that were now under their responsibility.  This is clear 
evidence of additional criminal legislation and increased offences.  It would seem that 
for Ireland the welfare state is truly over and society is becoming more punitive.  This 
concurs with Braithwaite (2000) but conflicts with the findings of Kilcommins et al., 
(2004) and Hamilton (2013) that Ireland has resisted punitive trends. 
 
5.4 Policing Activities 
 
5.4.1 Use of Prosecution Powers 
 
The expansion of policing organisations in Ireland has resulted in a blurring of 
traditional roles whereby, at least to date, An Garda Síochána have been joined by an 
ever increasing number of investigators and prosecutors who no longer rely on 
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compliance, regulations and civil procedures as the only enforcement options available.  
The research has shown that Irish policing organisations use various approaches to 
regulation including the co-operative, compliance-negotiation and the criminal coercive 
models.  The findings clearly demonstrate that both deterrence-based law enforcement 
and compliance-based law enforcement are utilised throughout these organisations. 
 
However the literature indicates that compliance-based law enforcement agencies such 
as regulators, avoid formal prosecutions, as this option is viewed as a sign of failure of 
the system (Zedner, 2004).  The findings of the research do not support this theory.  It is 
accurate to state that these policing organisations make full use of other enforcement but 
there is no evidence that they avoid prosecutions for fear of being seen as a failure, 
rather prosecution is used when and where necessary, with different organisations 
placing different values on the merit of prosecutions.  In fact, the research has indicated 
that there is an increased alignment between regulatory law and criminal law as 
evidenced by the wide number of regulatory bodies, which undertake prosecutions. 
 
An analysis of the prosecutions reveals that there was a 7% increase in the number of 
prosecutions between 2011 and 2012.  However, this is entirely due to the increase in 
prosecution numbers for An Post, which recorded an increase of 1,000 or 10% on the 
previous year.  Also, while there is a certain consistency across the years regarding the 
top ten prosecutors (in numerical terms) with eight of the top ten being present for both 
2011 and 2012, there was no overall single trend in terms of prosecution numbers.  
Indeed the primary research shows that of the 37 organisations where prosecution 
statistics were identified, the numbers of prosecutions, comparing 2011 with 2012, 
increased in 12 organisations, decreased in 18 others while seven recorded no change. 
 
The research reveals that in modern day Ireland, leaving aside criminal offences dealt 
with by An Garda Síochána, the most prosecuted offences, in numerical order, in the 
Republic of Ireland are failure to pay a television licence, failure to file a tax return, 
littering, breach of planning permission and fare evasion on public transportation.  It is 
notable that four organisations operating in the commercial world accounted for only 
10% of respondents but that three of the four were in the top six positions in terms of 
prosecution numbers.  On these facts it might appear that commercial bodies, with an 
obvious primary requirement to protect revenue are more prone to opt for prosecution as 
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a deterrent.  Alternatively, the prosecution option may also be the most effective 
deterrent available given the particular nature of each business. 
 
It is very significant that almost 13,500 of the estimated 15,000 prosecutions in 2011 
were generated from just three organisations (An Post, local authorities and the Revenue 
Commissioners).  However, the quantity of prosecutions is only a broad indicator of 
policing activity and is not a true indicator of worth. For example, a prosecution for non 
payment of a television licence or the non filing of an income tax return does not equate 
to a prosecution by the HSA for loss of life or limb. 
 
5.4.2 Networks 
 
The primary research provides evidence of networked or nodal governance as it 
identifies that organisations frequently interact across a system of networks.  In addition 
to working closely with An Garda Síochána, the research findings show that a number 
of organisations were active participants in a wide variety of networks.  These networks 
could be broadly divided into: 
a) Operational Networks: These included ‘multi-agency vehicle checks’ with An Garda 
Síochána, DSP and the Revenue Commissioners, and also joint investigations between 
the DSP, the Revenue Commissioners and the Taxi Regulator.  These operational 
networks also operate at an international level where two cross-border groups dedicated 
to tobacco and fuel fraud enforcement bring together police and Revenue staff from 
both sides of the Irish border. 
b) Information Networks: The primary research identified references to a ‘real time data 
link-up’ between the NTA, Revenue and DSP and also to a formal ‘exchange of 
information’ between the PRTB, DSP, Revenue and local authorities. 
c) National level Enforcement: Two significant national level networks identified 
include the ‘Environmental Enforcement Network’ which is coordinated by the EPA 
and includes, multiple agencies from both sides of the Irish border, and the FSAI which 
has overall responsibility for food safety in Ireland and which enforces food labelling 
regulations through service contracts with a multitude of other policing agencies. 
d) Cross Sector Networks: Two networks which extend beyond the state comprise an 
expert advisory committee for the protection of national heritage which includes the 
DAHG and a second network entitled the ‘Hidden Economy Monitoring Group’ which 
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is chaired by the Revenue Commissioners and which includes representatives from 
Government Departments, agencies, trade unions, and employer and business 
organisations.  This second network is a clear example of anchored pluralism as 
promoted by Loader and Walker (2007).  Here, the network is populated by a variety of 
factions from across society but the state occupies a pivotal position within the network.  
 
However, it is notable that the majority of networks involved only state policing 
agencies with no participation from beyond the state.  This concurs with Newburn 
(2001:834), who described the UK state policing equivalents as sitting outside of local 
security networks linked only in ‘the loosest sense to many other policing bodies’. 
 
5.4.3 Crime Data 
 
The primary research has identified 51 policing organisations, in addition to An Garda 
Síochána, actively prosecuting cases in Ireland.  However, there is no central list of 
these prosecutors held anywhere in Ireland.  The CSSO, the DPP, the Courts Service of 
Ireland, the Central Statistics Office nor the Department of Justice and Equality (DJE) 
maintain such list.  Equally there is no easily accessible statistical report on the 
prosecution activity of these policing organisations.  An examination of available 
statistics demonstrates that these statistics are more misleading than helpful.  For 
example, the Central Statistics Office published ‘recorded crime incidents’ for 2011, 
includes statistics on litter offences (19 convictions); dog offences (56 convictions); and 
rail travel offences (7 convictions), all under the heading of ‘Garda Recorded Crime 
Statistics’.  However, the equivalent statistics for the policing organisations of the local 
authorities and Iarnród Éireann, which are not published by the CSO, were 527, 133 and 
170 convictions respectively.  The irrelevance of the published CSO figures is obvious.  
 
Equally an analysis of the annual reports and statistics produced by the Courts Service 
reveals that other policing providers are reported in a single catch all category entitled 
‘other’.  This category is a mixture of prosecutions by An Garda Síochána and other 
organisations and officially includes ‘offences such as breach of bail, litter offences, 
street trading and offences prosecuted by government departments and other state 
agencies such as the Health and Safety Authority’.  A review of the last five years 
clearly demonstrates that the percentage of prosecutions credited to this category in 
comparison to overall court business has increased almost every year and this group 
 57 
represents a significant amount of court time.  However, it is not possible to separate the 
number of prosecutions initiated by An Garda Síochána from those of other agencies 
and as such the statistical output from this category is quite limited.   
 
The reality is that, in order to allow policy makers to make an informed decision it is 
important that they are aware of the facts.  However the primary research provides 
evidence that there is an information deficit with regard to statistical reports on the 
prosecution activities of identified policing organisations and the literature similarly 
suggests that this information deficit exists across all aspects of crime statistics. 
 
5.4.4 Transparency 
 
The literature raised concerns regarding legitimacy, accountability and fairness (Loader 
and Walker, 2007; Reiner, 2010), and predicted potential injustices from divergent 
policies (Zedner, 2004).  The research findings have indicated that these concerns may 
have merit, as there appears to be a lack of transparency in a number of policing 
organisations.  It is significant that ten of the 39 respondents (24%) actively chose not to 
publicise the number of prosecution staff within the organisation and that three 
respondents actively decided not to comment on the existence or otherwise of a 
centrally located criminal prosecution unit.  The analysis of the Oireachtas debates also 
includes examples of where organisations have refused to reveal the number of staff 
allocated to certain enforcement type roles.  There may be good operational reasons for 
not revealing, for example, the number of inspectors allocated to a particular role or 
location but as a general rule government funded organisations should promote 
transparency.  A non-disclosure regarding Garda numbers assigned to a particular 
division or city would not be acceptable and the same rules of transparency must apply 
to their policing colleagues in other agencies.  
 
In a similar context the primary research identified that there was a wide divergence 
regarding the publication of prosecution policies.  While a number of very detailed 
prosecution policies are easily accessible, for example, Central Bank, DSP, EPA, 
Revenue Commissioners, there are equally as many organisations which have no 
published policy regarding prosecution.  The research findings show that Irish policing 
organisations are in conflict with the advice of Loader and Walker (2007) who opined 
that in order for the state to be treated as the centre anchor within a pluralised policing 
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world the state must itself be civilized.  The literature very clearly highlights that the 
legitimacy of any organisation depends on a perceived fairness of procedural justice 
(Tyler, 1990 & 2003). 
 
5.4.5 Publication Policy 
 
The research discovered that there appears to be a rather arbitrary approach to 
publishing the personal details of individual cases found guilty of an offence.  The 
research discovered that seven organisations publish the details of all cases, 13 publish 
selected cases and 18 do not publish any details.  For example, the DECLG do not 
publish the names of those prosecuted for illegal dumping due to data protection issues 
(PQ 18745/13).  The result is that the personal details of those found guilty of certain 
offences will be published while others will not.  The dangers of labelling and the 
potential unplanned effect of actually increasing deviance are well documented in 
criminological literature and the importance of such a decision merits a strategic policy 
with a considered response for each case. 
 
In a similar context, policing organisations take different approaches to offenders who 
received the Probation Act.  Some organisations, for example the HSA, name the 
individual and present all of the case details while other organisations, such as, the EPA, 
have a policy of not publishing the details of such cases.  
 
5.5 Summary 
 
The primary research has highlighted the complexity of the policing bodies in the state, 
identifying a diverse range of organisations involved in policing in Ireland in 2013.  The 
research has verified that plural policing is expanding in Ireland and this is in line with 
other countries.  The primary research discovered evidence of networked or nodal 
governance and the expansion of regulatory governance.  While the number of 
organisations involved in prosecutions is increasing, there was no overall single trend in 
terms of actual prosecution numbers.  Concerns have been raised regarding limitations 
of available crime data, a possible lack of transparency and also what appears to be an 
adhoc approach to publication. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
6.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
 
This thesis sought to explore the various state policing organisations in existence in 
2013 in Ireland, in addition to An Garda Síochána and to produce a comprehensive 
empirical mapping of these governance entities.  Policing organisations were defined as 
only those organisations operating in a coercive manner at the most extreme end of the 
social control spectrum, that is, state directed organisations that actively prosecuted 
cases in the Irish courts.  The research identified 51 such organisations each operating in 
their own area of expertise but together forming a security governance of state 
appointed nodes.  The research ascertained that the number of these policing 
organisations have increased significantly over the last two decades.  The research 
clearly showed that this group of policing providers is subject to constant change with 
long established organisations now prosecuting for the first time, while other agencies 
are subject to merger or closure, as the government’s plans for the rationalisation of 
state agencies develops. 
 
The research identified the use of both deterrence-based and compliance-based law 
enforcement and confirmed that the prosecution option is commonly used throughout 
many of these organisations.  The study has shown that the Irish state has technically 
withdrawn from front-line policing in specific areas, opting for indirect rule by 
appointing regulators to police selected ring-fenced activities.  However, as almost all 
policing organisations report into a designated government department, the state 
actually retains a high level of control.  The research has also shown that many policing 
organisations are actively involved in a variety of networks with evidence that a form of 
state anchored pluralism is in existence.  It is very apparent that plural policing not only 
exists but also thrives within state appointed policing organisations.  
 
This research was unique in that it was the first time that organisations performing a 
policing role on behalf of the state have been empirically mapped in Ireland.  The 
literature on the topic is weakly developed and this study has made a contribution to the 
understanding of the subject by identifying and highlighting a multitude of state 
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appointed organisations acting in a police type role.  While the thesis focussed on the 
Irish state and has an obvious national level interest, the results have a wider application 
and could contribute internationally as other jurisdictions would benefit from a similar 
empirical mapping exercise. 
 
The distinct contribution of this research includes: 
1. A nationwide analysis of state policing entities. 
2. The documentation of plural policing within the wider public sector. 
3. The identification and analysis of the policing activities of these organisations, 
in particular the use of prosecutions. 
4. The analysis and confirmation of the governance of the policing organisations. 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
 
It is recommended that a planned and strategic approach be developed to maximise the 
performance of policing organisations within the state.  This strategy may include one 
or more of the specific recommendations listed below.  
 
Shared Services: 
The state’s whole-of-government approach, with an emphasis on cost-saving 
innovations, is actively promoting a policy of shared services.  However, to date this 
initiative has concentrated on such areas as human resources and information 
technology services.  Consideration should be given to exploring the possibility of a 
shared investigation, prosecution and/or legal service, especially for smaller agencies 
where the sanction of prosecutions is infrequently applied. 
 
Performance Measurement: 
It is recommended that the government explore the possibility of extending the 
performance measurement portal ‘Ireland Stat’ to include a comparison of policing 
performances across various entities within the state. The comparisons of programme 
and policy outcomes across state policing organisations should identify best practice 
and inform cost benefit analysis. 
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Experiential Learning: 
Organisations which operate in a policing role should have an opportunity to discuss 
similar policy issues such as crime prevention, crime reduction, effective and efficient 
compliance and enforcement measures with the goal of experiential learning from their 
counterparts.  Central government policy makers should consider the establishment of a 
relevant network, conference or seminar to achieve this sharing of knowledge. 
 
Transparent Prosecution Policy: 
Transparency and accountability are essential elements of any state organisation. 
Equally the legitimacy of every organisation is dependent on the acceptance of society 
that procedures are fair and transparent.  It is recommended that every organisation, 
which has the power to prosecute, should publish a clearly defined prosecution policy 
with clear rules of outlining the circumstances as to when a prosecution is likely to be 
pursued. 
 
Crime statistics: 
The limitations of available crime data was very evident throughout this study and it is 
highly recommended that a central organisation, such as the Department of Justice and 
Equality or the Central Statistics Office take responsibility for the collection and 
publication of crime data to include relevant crime statistics for all policing entities. On 
a related theme, this central unit should agree and co-ordinate a set of counting rules 
with regard to crimes and prosecutions for each policing organisation, similar to that in 
place for An Garda Síochána.  Simultaneously, consideration should be given to 
enhancing the Criminal Case Tracking System presently used by the Courts Service to 
track individual cases.  The availability of meaningful comprehensive crime data will 
assist policy makers in making an informed decision. 
 
6.3  The Future 
 
Each of the organisations identified could be researched in greater depth to further 
examine, for example, governance structures, participation in networks or impact of 
plural policing.  Alternatively research into state organisations that have the power to 
prosecute but that have not exercised such a power would prove beneficial. The fact 
remains that the concept of plural policing across state organisations is underdeveloped 
and it is an area that would benefit from further criminological research and analysis.   
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APPENDIX A – Introductory Letter 
 
    Thomas Talbot, 
    Revenue Commissioners, 
                            1st Floor, Block D, 
    Ashtowngate, 
    Dublin 15. 
                                  July 2013 
 
 
Re: Information Request 
 
I am writing to you to seek your assistance in obtaining some general information 
regarding “prosecutions” taken by your organisation. 
 
I am completing a Masters of Arts in Criminology in the Dublin Institute of 
Technology.  My dissertation is based on what is termed “plural policing” with a 
specific focus on non-Garda criminal prosecutions.  Obviously, An Garda Síochána, 
acting as the single Irish State police force, is the lead law enforcement agency within 
the State.  However, the Garda role is supplemented by an increasing number of 
government organisations pro-actively “policing” their own particular area of 
responsibility. The aim of my dissertation is to identify these organisations and 
highlight the “policing role” they undertake. 
 
To date, I have found in excess of 60 Irish State agencies, authorities, boards, 
commissions, government departments, institutes, offices, regulators and societies, all 
of which appear to have taken a prosecution case through the Irish Courts for breach of 
the legislation/regulations under their care.  
 
I am very aware that the prosecution avenue is only one of a number of enforcement 
options and in many cases it is only used as a last resort or in the most serious of cases.  
While I am using the specific use of “prosecution” to identify the entities that perform a 
“policing” role it is my intention to make reference to the many other compliance 
actions taken: warnings, penalties, confiscations, closure orders etc.  By noting the 
number and type of breaches identified together with the types of corrective actions 
taken, I propose to show that prosecutions are but one of many options used by State 
organisations.    
 
As someone who has spent a number of years in the Investigations and Prosecutions 
Division of the Revenue Commissioners, I appreciate that prosecuting an offending 
party can be a quite onerous and resource intensive task, which requires dedication and 
meticulous attention to detail.  As such one of the aims of my dissertation is to shine a 
light on the work of the multitude of “prosecutors” across all organisations in the State.  
The intention is not to compare individual organisations with each other but rather to 
quantify the prosecution work undertaken and achieved by government agencies as a 
whole.  In simple terms, my goal is to ensure all entities are listed and credited with the 
work they have done to date.   
 
I intend to quantify the number of prosecutions completed in 2011 or alternatively 2012 
if a sufficient number of 2012 annual reports have been completed and published.  My 
aim is then to compare the number of prosecutions and prosecuting bodies with a point 
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in history, possibly 1991 or 1992 when I suspect there were only a limited number of 
organisations outside of An Garda Síochána that processed their own prosecution cases. 
 
While I am only seeking general information and only information that is already in the 
public domain, I wish to emphasise that my dissertation will be completed strictly in 
accordance with the relevant code of ethics: in this case, the ethical codes of both D.I.T. 
and the Sociological Association of Ireland: 
http://www.dit.ie/researchandenterprise/researchatdit/ethicsindit/content/guidelines/ 
http://www.sociology.ie/docstore/dls/pages_list/3_sai_ethical_guidelines.pdf 
 
In order to ensure I have the correct information regarding your organisation, I would 
very much appreciate if you could assist me by: 
1.  Completing the questionnaire attached. 
2.  Forwarding on a hard copy of your annual reports for 2011 and 2012 if copies are 
available. 
3.  If you have a formal “prosecution policy”, by indicating the location of this 
information on your website. 
 
I appreciate that we are heading for the month of August and that a number of key 
personnel may be on annual leave.  Unfortunately I am on a very tight deadline to 
complete this dissertation and I would ask therefore, if at all possible, that the material 
be supplied at your earliest convenience.  Please feel free to contact me if you wish to 
discuss further or if you have any questions about any aspect of this request.   
 
Thanking you in advance for your kind assistance in this matter. 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
_________________ 
Thomas Talbot 
 
Telephone number:  01-8277150 
Mobile telephone no:  087-2349511 
E-mail address: ttalbot@revenue.ie 
Fax number:  01-8277228 
Address:  As above 
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APPENDIX B – Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire 
 
A. Organisation: 
 
Q. 1. What is the formal title of your organisation1? 
 ______________________________________ 
 
 
Q. 2.  In what year was your organisation first established? 
 
Year: __  __  __ __ 
 
 Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q. 3.  Has your organisation ever undergone a change of name since it was first established? 
 
 Yes   No        
 
If yes please list previous name(s)__________________________________________  
 
 Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q. 4. What structure best describes your organisation?  
 
Government Department             State sponsored body: Commercial 
[If Gov. Dept. skip Q.5.] 
 
Regulatory Body            State sponsored body: Non-Commercial 
 
Local Authority            Other (Pease specify: ______________) 
  
 
 
Q. 5.   Does your organisation report into a designated government department? 
  
Yes   No        
 
If yes please identify “parent” department: ___________________________________ 
 
 Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q. 6.   How large is your organisation in terms of staffing?  
           The approximate number of individual staff, regardless of work pattern, (Not FTEs2) 
           for the entire organisation at 01/01/2013 was: 
 
 
    1-24                25-49                                           50-99                               100-249               
 
             250-500                            501-1,000                                    1001-2,499                            >2,500 
 
                                                 
1
 For this questionnaire the word “organisation” refers to an Irish State Agency; Authority; Board; Commission;  
  Government Department; Institute; Office; Regulator; Society or similar entity. 
2
 The definition of a Full Time Equivalent (FTE) is one employee working full-time. 
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B. Prosecutions - General: 
 
Q. 7.   Is it possible for your organisation to quantify the number of staff who are dedicated  
          solely to criminal prosecution work?  
    
Yes   No             Would prefer not to advertise exact numbers  
 
    
  If yes, what number of individual staff, regardless of work pattern, (Not FTEs2) was  
  dedicated solely to criminal prosecution work as at 01/01/2013. 
 
0      1-4             5-9              10-19                    20-49                 50-99            >100 
 
 
Q. 8.   Does your organisation have a dedicated centrally located Criminal Prosecution Unit3? 
 
Yes   No                     Would prefer not to comment  
 
 
If yes please give details: ________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q. 9.   Does your organisation have access to advice from a “legal” team to assist in  
           processing criminal prosecution cases? (Tick all that apply) 
 
Yes – Internal legal team available                 
 
Yes – Legal advice is received from external legal advisors                  (specify: __________) 
 
No legal advice is sought for prosecution cases 
 
 
Q. 10.  Does your organisation have delegated authority i.e. the power to prosecute summarily 
without reference to the Director of Public Prosecutions (D.P.P.)? 
 
Yes   No              
  
Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q. 11.  In what year was legislation passed which first granted your organisation the power to 
            initiate a prosecution of any kind against an offender? 4 
 
Year: __  __  __ __ 
 
 Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q. 12.  In what year was the first case actually prosecuted for a breach of legislation / 
              regulations? 
 
Year: __  __  __ __ 
 
 Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
                                                 
3
 A centrally located unit is one with responsibility for specific prosecutions across the entire organisation. 
4
 It is noted that most summary prosecutions and all indictable prosecutions are authorised by, and brought in the 
  name of, the DPP. 
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Q. 13. Did An Garda Síochána previously prosecute similar offences before legislation was 
           passed to enable your organisation to initiate prosecutions on its own behalf? 4 
    
Yes   No             
 
  Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q. 14. Was the power to initiate prosecutions for certain offences granted to your organisation: 4 
 (Tick all that apply) 
 
Automatically on establishment of the organisation  
 
Following a request from your organisation  
 
Other – (Please specify) ____________________________ 
 
 
Please elaborate on the background to the granting of prosecution powers:  
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q. 15. Does your organisation make use of other enforcement/compliance options as well as  
           the prosecution option?  (Tick all that apply) 
 
Formal Warnings5                  Approximate number of cases in 2011* 
 
Monetary Penalties   Approximate number of cases in 2011* 
 
             Confiscations/Seizures   Approximate number of cases in 2011* 
            
Closure orders    Approximate number of cases in 2011* 
 
Other Options                 Approximate number of cases in 2011* 
      (2011* - Leave blank if unsure or 
Other Options =________________                  statistics are not readily available) 
 
_____________________________ 
 (Please specify type and approx. number) 
 
         
  
C. Prosecutions - Statistics: 
 
Q. 16. Does your organisation publish prosecution statistics (actual numbers) on your website? 
            Yes    No 
  
 
If yes, please copy link to web page: ___________________________________ 
 
 
Q. 17. Does your organisation publish details of prosecution cases on your website? 
           Yes - All cases   Yes - Selected cases   No 
  
 
If yes, please copy link to web page: ___________________________________ 
                                                 
5
 Formal warnings are only those warnings which were documented and recorded in official statistics  
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Q. 18. How many cases were prosecuted in 2011 by your organisation? 4 
           (Indicate only one of the following) 
 
            Total number prosecuted6                      (Enter number if one or more cases prosecuted) 
  
 Nil - No cases in this year    
 
            Unable to quantify at this time 
  
             Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification or if your organisation uses a different 
             definition or means of counting prosecution cases in your statistics to that described at footnote 6) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q. 19. How many cases were prosecuted in 2012 by your organisation? 4 
           (Indicate only one of the following) 
 
            Total number prosecuted6                           (Enter number if one or more cases prosecuted) 
  
 Nil - No cases in this year    
 
            Unable to quantify at this time 
  
             Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification or if your organisation uses a different 
             definition or means of counting prosecution cases in your statistics to that described at footnote 6) 
        
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q. 20. Please list a sample of the three most common offences, which are prosecuted by your  
            organisation? 4 
1. _________________________________________ 
2. _________________________________________ 
3. _________________________________________ 
 
 
Q. 21. Please comment generally on the importance and/or relevance, or otherwise, of criminal  
           prosecutions as an enforcement option to your organisation. 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q. 22. Is there any particular prosecution case or aspect of your prosecution programme, which  
           you would like to highlight, which has not been covered by earlier questions? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
            
 
Q. 23. Contact Person: 
The name of a person in the organisation who can be contacted regarding the material in  
            this questionnaire is Name: _______________________ 
         Telephone number: _____________ 
         E-mail address: ________________ 
                                                 
6
 The number of cases prosecuted includes both summary and indictable convictions within the year in question.  
  It does not include cases where the probation Act was applied.  
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APPENDIX C – Specific topics mentioned in the Oireachtas (Jan to Jul 2013) 
 
Organisation Topic J F M A M J J Total 
An Post TV Licence 1       1 
Central Bank Banking Crisis / Investigations      4 3 7 
Central Bank Central Bank Bill 2011      1 2 3 
Central Bank Corporate Governance 1       1 
CRO Company Law Issues     1   1 
CRO Company Registrations       1 1 
DAFM Animal Health & Welfare Bill 2012   1  1   2 
DAFM Animal Welfare/Disease Issues  2  3   1 6 
DAFM Food Labelling   1     1 
DAFM Horse Related Issues 3 5 4  1  1 14 
DAFM Single Payment Scheme  1      1 
DAFM Tree Felling      1  1 
DAHG Sites & National monuments    1   1 2 
DAHG Wildlife Protection 1 2 2     5 
DCENR New EU Directive      1  1 
DOH Sun bed Regulations       1 1 
DSP Departmental Schemes    1 1   2 
DSP DSP Checkpoints       1 1 
DSP Fraud Costs       1 1 
DSP Revenue Commissioners - Frauds   2     2 
DSP Social Welfare Bills 2012/2013 1    1 2  4 
DSP Staffing Matters       1 1 
DSP Taxi Regulation Bill 2012 1    1   2 
EPA Environmental Regulations  1      1 
EPA EPA Governance 1    1   2 
EPA Illegal Dumping 1 1  1   1 4 
EPA Waste Water Treatment      1 1 2 
FSAI Food Labelling   1     1 
FSAI Horse Meat Investigation  1 1  1   3 
GSOC Delays in Receipt of Information     1   1 
GSOC Operation of GSOC     1   1 
HSE Child Care     2 5 9 16 
HSE EPA Governance 1       1 
HSE Food Labelling   1     1 
HSE Public Health Tobacco Bill 2013 1       1 
HSE Tobacco Control Measures 1    1   2 
IFI EPA Governance 1       1 
IMB Prescription Medicines     1 1  2 
LMS (NSAI) Food Labelling   1     1 
Local Authorities Air Pollution  1   1   2 
Local Authorities Carbon Tax Collection     1   1 
Local Authorities Environmental Regulations  1      1 
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Organisation Topic J F M A M J J Total 
Local Authorities EPA Governance 1       1 
Local Authorities Food Labelling   1     1 
Local Authorities Housing  1 1   2  4 
Local Authorities Illegal Dumping 1 1  2   1 5 
Local Authorities Litter Pollution    1    1 
Local Authorities Waste Management Issues    1    1 
NERA Employment Rights     1  2 3 
NERA Revenue Commissioners Frauds   2     2 
NERA School Building Projects     1   1 
NTA Social Welfare Bills 2012/2013 1     1  2 
NTA Taxi Regulation Bill 2012 1 2  1 2   6 
NTCO Tobacco Control Measures 1    1   2 
ODCE Banking Crisis / Investigations      4 8 12 
ODCE Corporate Governance 1       1 
ODCE HMV Vouchers 1       1 
PRTB Anti-Social Behaviour   1     1 
PRTB PRTB Tenancy Registration     2   2 
PRTB Residential Tenancies Bill 2012 1       1 
PSA Role of the PSA 1       1 
PSI Pharmacy Regulations 1       1 
Revenue  Carbon Tax Collection     1   1 
Revenue  Customs Seizures / Funding 2       2 
Revenue  Fuel Fraud   1 1 2 2 3 9 
Revenue  Prescription Medicines     1 1  2 
Revenue  Public Health Tobacco Bill 2013 1       1 
Revenue  Social Welfare Bills 2012/2013 2     2  4 
Revenue  Staffing Matters    2  2  4 
Revenue  Tobacco Fraud 2 4 3 1 2 1 2 15 
Revenue  Accountability   1     1 
Revenue  DSP Checkpoints       1 1 
Revenue  Environmental Regulations  1      1 
Revenue  EPA Governance 1       1 
Revenue  Liquor Licensing Laws 1       1 
Revenue  Local Property Tax 1       1 
Revenue  PRTB Tenancy Registration     1   1 
Revenue  Tax Avoidance / Compliance  1 1 1 3   6 
Revenue  Taxi Regulation Bill 2012     1   1 
SFPA Fisheries Offences    1    1 
SFPA Fisheries Protection       1 1 
SFPA Food Labelling   1     1 
Total   34 25 26 17 34 31 42 209 
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APPENDIX D - The number of cases prosecuted* in 2011 and 2012. 
Organisation 2012 2011 % change 
An Post 11,500 10,500 10%
Office of the Revenue Commissioners** 1,517 1,626 -7%
Data Protection Commissioner 195 54 261%
Road Safety Authority 182 166 10%
Companies Registration Office* 179 98 83%
Iarnród Éireann 156 170 -8%
Dublin Bus 147 64 130%
Department of Social Protection 128 194 -34%
Inland Fisheries Ireland 96 185 -48%
National Employment Rights Authority 70 56 25%
National Transport Authority 57 78 -27%
National Education Welfare Board 49 75 -35%
Electricity Supply Board 42 10 320%
Sea Fisheries Protection Authority** 26 12 117%
National Tobacco Control Office (Health Service Executive) 23 23 0%
Health and Safety Authority 18 31 -42%
Environmental Protection Agency 17 23 -26%
Pensions Board 15 26 -42%
Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland* 12 5 140%
Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine 10 6 67%
Irish Medicines Board 9 9 0%
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission** 5 4 25%
Private Residential Tenancies Board 4 14 -71%
Private Security Authority 4 10 -60%
Central Statistics Office 4 7 -43%
Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement 4 5 -20%
Pensions Ombudsman 3 11 -73%
NPWS - Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht 3 5 -40%
Commission for Energy Regulation 2 0 100%
National Consumer Agency 1 2 -50%
Competition Authority 1 1 0%
NSAI Legal Metrology Service 1 1 0%
Food Safety Authority of Ireland 0 2 -100%
Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland 0 1 -100%
Commission for Aviation Regulation 0 0 
Veterinary Council of Ireland 0 0 
National Milk Agency 0 0 
 14,480 13,474 7%
 
 This is a list of 37 of the 51 prosecuting agencies where it was possible to identify prosecution numbers. 
 Taking note of the various counting rules applied by different organisations, the figures above should 
be regarded as a broad indicator only of the number of prosecutions completed in 2011 and 2012. 
 It should be emphasised that prosecution numbers represent only one element of the compliance / 
enforcement work engaged in by the organisations listed above. 
 *   This information was retrieved by way of official publications.   
** Investigations are referred to and prosecuted in the name of the DPP. 
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APPENDIX E – Reference List of Dáil and Seanad Éireann Debates 
 
Dáil Debates 
Dáil Debates, 24 January 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Residential Tenancies (Amendment) 
(No. 2) Bill 2012: Second Stage (Resumed). 
Dáil Debates, 14 March 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Interim Report on Equine DNA-
Mislabelling of Processed Meat: Statements. 
Dáil Debates, 2 May 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Other Questions Garda Síochána 
Ombudsman Commission. 
Dáil Debates, 16 May 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Taxi Regulation Bill 2012 [Seanad]: 
Second Stage. 
Dáil Debates, 29 May 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Topical Issue Debate Crèche 
Inspections. 
Dáil Debates, 11 June 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Social Welfare and Pensions 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2013: Committee Stage. 
Dáil Debates, 9 July 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Other Questions - Social Welfare Fraud. 
 
Seanad Debates 
Seanad Éireann Debate, 2 July 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Central Bank (Supervision and 
Enforcement) Bill 2011: Report and Final Stages. 
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APPENDIX F – Reference List of Parliamentary Questions  
 
Parliamentary Questions 1808/13, 16 January 2013. www.kildarestreet.com. 
Parliamentary Questions 3705/13, 29 January 2013. www.kildarestreet.com. 
Parliamentary Questions 4149/13, 29 January 2013. www.kildarestreet.com. 
Parliamentary Questions 7979/13, 14 February 2013. www.kildarestreet.com. 
Parliamentary Questions 14590/13, 26 March 2013. www.kildarestreet.com. 
Parliamentary Questions 15094/13, 26 March 2013. www.kildarestreet.com. 
Parliamentary Questions 16987/13, 16 April 2013. www.kildarestreet.com. 
Parliamentary Questions 18542/13, 23 April 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.  
Parliamentary Questions 19033/13, 23 April 2013. www.kildarestreet.com. 
Parliamentary Questions 22804/13, 14 May 2013. www.kildarestreet.com. 
Parliamentary Questions 26289/13, 30 May 2013. www.kildarestreet.com. 
Parliamentary Questions 27470/13, 11 June 2013. www.kildarestreet.com. 
Parliamentary Questions 27635/13, 11 June 2013. www.kildarestreet.com. 
Parliamentary Questions 31797/13, 2 July 2013. www.kildarestreet.com. 
Parliamentary Questions 32154/13, 2 July 2013. www.kildarestreet.com. 
Parliamentary Questions 36688/13, 18 July 2013. www.kildarestreet.com. 
